Proposals to provide or subsidize health insurance for low-income families must take account of the fact that many workers have access to employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), but decline it because of required employee premium contributions. This article considers a tax credit for the employee share of ESI in the context of a broader program of income-based health insurance tax credits. Helping uninsured workers pay for available ESI could be more cost-effective than subsidizing their coverage in the nongroup market. The credit would also be available to workers who were already covered, both for equity reasons and to reduce the incentives for employers to drop coverage or for workers to shift to subsidized individual plans. One key issue is how to prevent employers from reducing their current health plan contributions to take advantage of the new funding. Other design questions considered by the article include whether workers should be able to choose between ESI and nongroup coverage, whether minimum benefit standards should apply for employer plans, and how to achieve a fair balance in subsidies for group and nongroup coverage.
Many low-income workers decline employer-sponsored insurance. In 1996, 17% of uninsured people with incomes below the federal poverty level, and 28% of those with incomes from 100% to 200% of poverty, were workers who had been offered employer-sponsored insurance (ESI), or were the spouses or minor children of such workers. 1 It is likely that many of those who fail to take up available employer coverage are deterred by required employee premium contributions. Average employee contributions for single coverage went from $8 a month in 1988 to $35 in 1999; monthly contributions for family coverage went from $52 to $145 (KFF-HRET 1999) . Many workers must pay even higher amounts; employee contributions have been shown to vary by firm size, industry, geography, and the proportion of low-wage workers in a firm (Peterson and Vistnes 2000) .
Take-up of ESI by modest-income families might be increased through some form of public subsidy for required employee contributions. Helping with ESI could be more effective than providing insurance directly through a public program or through tax subsidies for nongroup insurance for at least two reasons. First, employers would cover much of the cost, allowing limited public funds to reach more people. Second, families might be more likely to participate in ESI than to enroll in a public plan or shop for nongroup coverage, both because enrollment at the workplace is easier and more convenient, and because most Americans prefer employment-based coverage (Duchon et al. 2000) .
ESI assistance could be furnished in a variety of ways: Ⅺ Through the tax system, in the form of a new credit or deduction, or by excluding the employee share of premiums from taxable income in the same way that employer contributions are now excluded. (The latter approach is part of the insurance reform proposal advanced by the Health Insurance Association of America.) Ⅺ As a component of a broader public program to reach the uninsured. For example, many states already provide ESI assistance to people meeting the eligibility standards for Medicaid; a few do so under the State Children's Health Insurance Program (SCHIP) or other state programs. 2 Ⅺ As a freestanding initiative.
It seems unlikely that Congress or the states would adopt an ESI subsidy without taking measures to expand coverage for people at the same income level without access to ESI. This paper assumes that ESI assistance would be part of a broader program. Many of the issues in designing an ESI subsidy depend on the nature of the non-ESI program to which it is attached; for example, a subsidy offered in conjunction with a new federal health insurance tax credit or deduction would obviously be administered differently from assistance offered as part of a state-operated public insurance program. However, two fundamental concerns arise in considering any ESI subsidy proposal:
Ⅺ Should assistance be provided to currently insured workers, or only to those who have not previously taken up coverage? Ⅺ How can employers be prevented from reducing their contributions for subsidy-eligible workers to take account of any new public funds?
This paper begins with a general discussion of these basic questions. It then considers other elements of program design, using for illustration one specific option: an ESI tax credit designed as an adjunct to a general income-based health insurance tax credit for nongroup coverage. While this option will be considered in the greatest detail, an effort will also be made to show how different design decisions might be appropriate in the context of a state-administered program.
Treatment of the Currently Insured
Most people who are offered ESI, even those with very low incomes, accept it. If one excludes individuals who had some other form of coverage (such as Medicare or Medicaid), the take-up rate for ESI by families with incomes below 100% of poverty in 1996 was 70%, and 80% for those with incomes from 100% to 200% of poverty. 3 A program offering ESI subsidies for every family below a given income limit might reach three or four currently insured people for each previously uninsured person newly covered. The ratio could be even higher if, as is likely, the currently insured took up the new subsidy more frequently than the uninsured. This might well be more costly than covering the uninsured people directly through a public program or nongroup tax credit. For this reason, proposals to subsidize ESI often seek to exclude the currently insured. For example, federal guidelines for states using SCHIP funds to provide ESI assistance allow assistance only for children who have not had ESI during a period of six to 12 months prior to applying.
As Zelenak (2001) points out in rejecting a similar restriction on eligibility for a nonemployer tax credit, the rule is difficult to enforce, and it penalizes people who have lost employer coverage involuntarily. 4 Perhaps more important, the rule is patently inequitable. Workers who previously declined ESI would receive assistance. Co-workers at the same income level who might be paying a significant amount for coverage would have to go on doing so-or would have to go without insurance for some period in order to qualify for assistance.
The model presented in this paper comes down on the side of equity and would allow subsidies for lowincome families who were already receiving ESI. In consequence, most of the new public spending would go for the currently insured, and the cost per newly insured person would be quite high. This might be politically fatal in the current environment. While fairness is important, there are many inequities in the current system; Congress and states are likely to give greater priority to efficient use of limited funds.
Finding an appropriate balance between equity and targeting might depend on whether a new initiative is viewed as a short-term, stopgap measure to reach some share of the uninsured, or as a program that might have a permanent place in our health financing system. The SCHIP guideline, excluding the currently insured, reflects the legislative intent to use a fixed amount of funds to achieve immediate reductions in the number of uninsured children. While attempting to lock out the currently insured makes sense in this context, it may not be tenable over a longer term, for several reasons.
First, people change jobs, enter and leave the workforce, go on and off public programs. Coverage is especially unstable for the lower-income workers 123 likely to be the target of a subsidy program. Among people with incomes below 200% of poverty who had employer coverage at any time during 1996, onethird had coverage for only part of the year; 89% of higher-income people with employer coverage retained it for the entire year. 5 A ''firewall'' rule that locks out the currently insured might be effective over a brief period, but its effects would diminish over time.
Second, as noted earlier, an ESI subsidy is likely to be offered in the context of some broader coverage initiative, such as a tax credit for nongroup health insurance or expanded public coverage. If a nongroup tax credit is very generous, or if a comprehensive public program is available at little or no cost, many modest-income workers might be better off shifting to employment that offered higher wages or other benefits in place of health insurance. In the long term, it must be expected that employers seeking to attract these workers would modify their compensation schemes accordingly. If ESI is less beneficial to workers than wages or other benefits, it will gradually erode. Whether an ESI subsidy can shift the balance enough to prevent this erosion will be considered at the end of this paper.
Possible Employer Responses
A new public program offering to cover some or all of an employee's share of premium costs would give employers an obvious incentive to modify their contribution schemes. This would be easier in a lowwage firm, where most workers might qualify for ESI assistance. The employer could simply raise the required employee share to the maximum amount of assistance available. It seems less likely that mixedwage firms, in which some but not all workers qualified for a subsidy, would respond in this way: presumably, they would not reduce contributions for all employees to take account of a benefit available only to a few of them. However, there might be opportunities for mixed-wage firms to isolate subsidy-eligible workers.
While there are nondiscrimination rules under the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (and, for self-insured employers only, under the Internal Revenue Code), employers can establish classes of workers according to factors that may be closely related to credit eligibility, such as occupation or duration of employment, and can have different contribution policies for different classes. Or an employer could increase required contributions for all work-ers and hold higher-wage workers harmless by raising their wages. 6 If a firm could reduce contributions for subsidyeligible workers while holding other employees harmless, it might well have an incentive to do so. This is a formidable objection to ESI subsidies, and there is no entirely satisfactory solution. Employers cannot simply be forbidden to reduce their contributions. A state rule of this kind would be pre-empted by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), while a federal rule requiring that employers forever continue to pay what they do now is politically inconceivable. Some proposals would try to achieve the same effect indirectly by providing that assistance with ESI could be furnished only if an employer had not reduced its contribution level during some recent period. Employers then could not cut their contributions without injuring their workers by rendering them ineligible for assistance. However, enforcement would require some form of universal tracking of employer contribution levels over time; adoption of such a system seems unlikely.
One alternative is to set the ESI subsidy at some percentage of the required employee contribution, rather than the full amount. For example, the subsidy might cover 50% of the employee share; if an employer reduced its contribution by $100, the employees themselves would face $50 in additional cost. Presumably-at least in a full employment marketemployers could not unilaterally reduce compensation in this way. However, the employer could make up the $50 difference by raising wages and would still save money. 7 The incentives for employer gaming could be removed only by reducing the ESI subsidy to a very small share of the required employee contribution. As workers now declining available ESI are likely to be in firms that already make the lowest contributions, the reduced ESI subsidy would fail to fulfill its initial goal of improving participation.
The SCHIP guidelines for ESI subsidies suggest another way to prevent employer gaming. A state may provide a subsidy only when the employer is contributing a specified minimum percentage-generally 60%-of the premium for family coverage. 8 A rule of this kind would at least prevent some precipitous reductions in employer contributions, though it would not keep employers above the threshold from dropping to the minimum. However, there would then be the question of what to do with workers whose employers were already contributing less than the minimum. If they could not receive the ESI subsidy, should they instead be allowed access to a public program or tax-subsidized nongroup coverage? The answer is clearly yes: it would be unacceptable to lock workers into employer plans that exposed them to very high costs while providing assistance to people in more generous employer plans.
However, the rule then becomes self-defeating. Even if an employer only contributed, say, 40% of the premiums, it would be cheaper for the government to pay the other 60% in the form of an ESI subsidy than to pay 100% of the cost of public coverage or a tax credit. 9 There would also be a risk that some low-wage employers would simply drop their contribution below the threshold to encourage their workers to shift into the public program. 10 Despite these important drawbacks, the minimum contribution rule seems the most workable option, and it is adopted in the model presented in the next section.
A Subsidy Model and Variants

Basic Model
A refundable ESI credit (ESIC) would be provided as an adjunct to the program of income-based tax credits for nongroup coverage described by Zelenak (2001) .
Under the Zelenak proposal, a refundable credit averaging $2,000 for single coverage and $4,000 for family coverage would be available to anyone with a family income below about 200% of the federal poverty level. The amount of the credit would be adjusted for the age and sex of the tax filer; the credit would gradually phase out as income rose above 200% of poverty. 11 The credit could only be used to purchase private nongroup coverage and could not be applied to ESI. However, current ESI participants meeting the income test would be free to drop their ESI and shift to subsidized nongroup coverage.
The ESIC would be targeted to workers in approximately the same income range who had access to ESI. The key features are as follows:
Ⅺ The ESIC would be available to people who had access to ESI with a minimum employer contribution of at least 70% of the cost for single coverage or 50% of the cost for family coverage. Ⅺ No one eligible for the ESIC would be allowed to participate in the nongroup credit program. Ⅺ The ESIC would be equal to the lesser of: a) a worker's required ESI contribution for single or family coverage, or b) an income-based maximum amount. The formula for computing this cap is described subsequently. Unlike the nongroup credit, the ESIC would not be age-adjusted. Ⅺ The ESIC would be administered by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS). Taxpayers could claim it in their annual return or could obtain advance payment during the year from their employers through a process comparable to that used for advance payment of the earned income credit (EIC).
Eligibility
As noted, anyone within the income limits for the nongroup credit, whether or not currently insured, would be eligible for the ESIC if the employer were contributing 70% of the single coverage cost or 50% of the family coverage cost. Workers with access to ESI not meeting the minimum contribution standard could not obtain the ESIC, but would be eligible for the nongroup credit if they chose to obtain coverage outside their employer plan.
Setting the minimum employer contribution. The proposed minimum contribution levels are arbitrarily set about 10 percentage points below the national average employer contribution in firms with a high proportion of low-income workers. 12 Even with these minimum contributions, the ESIC would be unavailable for many employer plans. Ineligible plans would be more prevalent in different industries, firm sizes, and regions. For example, the average employer in the West (whether or not low wage) contributes 69% toward single coverage, less than the specified threshold. Ideally, the minimum contribution might be set in relation to prevailing contribution levels in comparable firms, defined by a number of parameters. This would be unwieldy for a national tax credit, but a state program could take account of local employer practices.
Requiring that workers accept ESI. Should people with access to ESI that meets the minimum contribution level be required to take the ESIC, or could they instead choose to obtain the nongroup credit and seek coverage outside their employer plans? Similarly, if an ESI subsidy were available in the context of a public insurance program, could a worker opt for the public coverage instead of enrolling in the employer plan?
Since one of the basic arguments for an ESI subsidy is that it is more cost-effective to draw on available employer contributions than to provide coverage entirely with public funds, it would seem to make sense to require that people accept ESI when it was available. Moreover, if people could choose between ESI and alternative coverage, there would be potentially undesirable risk-selection effects. This is particularly true in the basic model examined here, which is tied to a very generous tax credit for nongroup coverage. In most states, nongroup insurers may vary premiums according to age, health status, or other factors, while employee contributions to ESI may not vary by health status. (Some employers vary contributions by age.) Although nongroup coverage can cost as much as 30% more than group coverage for comparable benefits, the discounts available to younger and healthier purchasers of nongroup coverage more than offset this difference (except in the very few states with stringent rating regulation). Low-risk workers eligible for the maximum nongroup credit might be able to find coverage that is much more generous than their current employer plan. In the Zelenak proposal, this risk is mitigated, because the nongroup credit would be age-adjusted. However, nongroup insurers could offer more attractive rates and enhanced benefits to the lowest-risk applicants within each age group. The departure of the healthiest workers from the employer plan would raise average costs for those remaining in the plan. 13 If, on the other hand, a subsidy for nongroup coverage were accompanied by some form of community-rating requirement in the nongroup market, the post-subsidy cost for the highest-risk workers could be less than the amount their employer was contributing to their ESI. Employers might encourage their high-cost workers to shift to nongroup coverage by negotiating some increase in wages or other benefits on an individual basis. 14 The same could occur if the alternative to ESI were some form of public plan.
On balance, it seems reasonable that people with access to ESI should be made ineligible for the nongroup credit, and the basic model includes this provision. However, the rule is likely to be unacceptable to a number of key stakeholders. Obviously, nongroup insurers would be unhappy, because they would lose a large share of the new market created by the nongroup credit. (Insurers selling to employer groups would gain; these are not necessarily the same insurers.) At the same time, mixed-wage employers would have to continue paying for health benefits for workers who would otherwise have given up their ESI. These employers would also have to cover any new participants who would have declined ESI in the absence of the ESIC.
More broadly, many of the people who advocate tax benefits for nongroup coverage do so in the name of promoting freedom of choice. They believe that individuals should be free to select their own preferred carrier and level of benefits, rather than have to take a ''one-size-fits-all'' plan selected by their employer. Some support for a tax credit could evaporate if it were accompanied by a rule that would defeat this basic objective.
Interaction with SCHIP. The nongroup family credit would be set at twice the amount of the single credit on the assumption that most children in families within the credit's income limits would be eligible for SCHIP. It thus contemplates that families would have split coverage, with parents in nongroup plans and children in SCHIP. The proposed ESIC for families below the phase-out level is so generous that it should usually cover the full employee contribution for family coverage. Most families with SCHIP-eligible children would probably enroll their children in the employer plan. This is not inherently undesirable. More children would likely become insured if parents could enroll them in an employer plan instead of having to apply separately for SCHIP coverage. In addition, families would be better able to navigate managed care systems if all family members were in a single plan. However, a shift of children from SCHIP to tax-subsidized ESI would have two drawbacks.
First, the state contribution toward SCHIP would be lost; the ESIC would be paid entirely with federal dollars. However, it is likely that the incremental cost of covering children through the ESIC would be less than the federal share of the cost of covering the same children through SCHIP. 15 The trade-off could be evaluated over time; if there was a real federal loss, this could be made up through adjustments in the SCHIP grant allocations or matching payment formula.
Second, children in employer plans might not receive the preventive care and other minimum benefits available under SCHIP. Whether there should be any minimum benefit standard for employer plans is discussed in the next section. In the absence of any standard, SCHIP might function as a supplement to the employer plan. This would require a change in SCHIP rules, which currently preclude the use of the program as a supplement for children with other coverage.
Coverage and Plan Standards
If people with access to ESI were required to accept it, should there be some minimum benefit standards for the employer plans? Should people with access only to a ''substandard'' plan, however defined, be allowed instead to choose coverage under the nongroup credit or a public plan?
In the basic model, tied to a nongroup credit, the answer is probably no. 16 It is true that some people might have to accept a plan less comprehensive than the one they could have purchased with the nongroup credit. However, the nongroup credit proposal itself does not guarantee that every credit participant will be able to purchase any particular level of benefits. Those who are high risk, or who live in high-cost areas, would probably be able to obtain only plans inferior to most employer coverage. So the enrollees most disadvantaged by a lock-in to employer coverage are the lower-risk workers-precisely the group whose migration out of ESI the lock-in rule is meant to prevent. Moreover, a minimum benefit standard for a national program providing funds for ESI would face considerable opposition. Even though the standards would apply only to plans purchased with the ESIC, they would likely be seen as the entering wedge for more general standards for employer plans.
The issue is more difficult when the alternative to ESI is a public program that furnishes some particular level of benefits (or a nongroup credit available only for plans meeting some minimum standards). Under SCHIP, for example, state public programs must provide coverage equal to a specified benchmark, and there are restrictions on the amount of copayments or other cost-sharing that may be imposed. States that choose to provide ESI assistance must assure that the children in employer plans receive coverage that meets these requirements. This means that the state either must provide assistance only for plans meeting the standards or must somehow supplement substandard employee plans, for example by providing ''wraparound'' coverage through the public program. 17 Compliance with these requirements is extremely cumbersome. The state must somehow assess the benefits under each employer plan, and administering a wraparound program is complicated. 18 Whether minimum standards are appropriate may depend in part on the goals of the program. An insurance program such as SCHIP, one of whose major goals is to improve access to preventive and well-child care, would reasonably take steps to assure that children in employer plans not face any barriers to these services. A program targeted at adults or at families with somewhat higher income levels might emphasize general improvement in access and financial protection, rather than access to any specific set of services.
Amount and Structure of the Subsidy
Basic credit amount. There are a variety of ways in which the credit amount could be established. The simplest would be to set the credit at the lesser of: the actual premium contribution made by the worker, or the maximum nongroup credit for a worker with the same income. There are at least two possible objections to this method:
1. Most workers receiving the ESIC would be better off than those who receive the nongroup credit and buy nongroup coverage.
Because nongroup coverage is more costly than equivalent group coverage, even recipients of the maximum nongroup credit would probably have to pay more than the credit amount to receive benefits comparable to those offered in a typical employer plan. In addition, workers with incomes in the phaseout range might pay nothing for their ESI, while workers at the same wage level receiving the nongroup credit would have to contribute toward the cost of their coverage. 19 If the aim were absolute equity, one would wish to ensure that the ESIC recipient was left neither better nor worse off than the nongroup credit recipient. The ESIC might be adjusted for estimated differences in group and nongroup benefit values, or might be reduced so that workers above the phase-out range would have to contribute something toward their coverage. 20 Neither of these adjustments has been adopted here because part of the aim of the ESIC is to encourage people to remain in jobs that offer ESI; they are more likely to do so if ESI retains some advantages.
2. The total federal cost-including the ESIC and the existing tax subsidy for the employer's share of the premium-could be more than the cost of the nongroup credit for someone with the same income.
Employer contributions to health insurance are excluded from workers' taxable income for both income tax and Social Security/Medicare payroll taxes. If an employer contributed 70% of a $2,000 premium for single coverage, or $1,400, the tax subsidy for this contribution would be $424 (for a worker in the 15% tax bracket). If the ESIC covered the employee's $600 share, total federal spending would be $1,024. This is equal to the available nongroup credit for a single person with an income of about 275% of poverty, and considerably more than the credit for people with higher incomes.
The ESIC is most likely to cost the federal government more than the nongroup tax credit for workers with incomes in the phase-out range. For lowerincome workers, the sum of the ESIC and the income/payroll tax subsidy would exceed the nongroup credit only if the employer plan were exceptionally expensive. 21 A precise adjustment for this problem would re-quire a cap on the ESIC based on the worker's income and the amount of the tax-subsidized employer contribution. While a cap could be computed fairly easily, the resulting credit tables would be dauntingly complex. The solution adopted here is to cap the ESIC at an amount equal to: the average nongroup credit for a worker at the same income level, minus 80% of the worker's required ESI contribution. 22 For example, if the worker's income were 300% of poverty and the worker's ESI contribution were $600, the ESIC would be the average nongroup credit of $732 minus $480 (80% of $600), or $252. Unlike the nongroup credit, the ESIC would not be adjusted for age and sex. This adjustment makes sense for the nongroup credit because it equalizes the buying power of different participants in a market that customarily uses age and sex in setting premiums. Required employee contributions usually do not vary by age and sex in a given firm; an adjustment would underpay younger workers and overpay older ones. The omission of the age adjustment would disadvantage workers in firms with predominantly older enrollees, if these workers therefore faced higher contribution requirements than workers in firms with younger or mixed-age employees.
Treatment of couples and families. The ESIC for family coverage would be computed similarly, except that the cap would be equal to the nongroup credit for a family at the same income level minus 40% of the ESI contribution. Like the nongroup credit, the ESIC would not vary by number of family members covered under the employer plan.
A couple with two earners, both eligible for ESI through their own firms, could apply the credit to employee-only coverage under both plans or to employee-plus-dependent coverage under one of the plans. This rule is probably not ideal; it might encourage more employers to adopt a rule, already in place in some firms, that a worker cannot cover a spouse who is eligible for ESI elsewhere. However, requiring that a couple choose one employer plan could increase credit costs, because the required employee contribution for family coverage would often exceed the sum of contributions for employee-only coverage in two plans.
Finally, computing the credit for workers with a choice of plans or with access to flexible benefit arrangements raises some technical issues. In 1999, 25% of workers had a choice of health plans, usually at differing prices to the worker. Half of all workers had access to cafeteria plans-under which a worker may choose among different health insurance op-tions, other benefits, or cash-or to flexible spending accounts (FSAs), through which the worker may pay the required share of ESI premiums with tax-exempt dollars. (KFF-HRET 1999) . In multiple choice plans, should the credit be available for the full contribution to any plan selected by the employee, or should it be limited to the cost of the least expensive option? In cafeteria plans, has a worker who chooses health benefits effectively paid for them by forgoing other benefits or wages? If so, should the ESIC compensate the worker? 23 Should the ESIC be adjusted to prevent a dual tax benefit for workers with access to FSAs? Resolution of these questions might require some balancing of fairness and administrative simplicity. 24
Administration
Administering an ESI subsidy through the tax system would be fairly straightforward. Perhaps the most difficult problem would be obtaining the necessary information to enforce the requirement that people claiming the nongroup credit not have access to ESI. Administration of an ESI subsidy provided directly by a state or other public program would present very different issues that will not be reviewed here. (For an overview of design issues in SCHIP ESI assistance programs see Neuschler and Tollen 2000.) The ESIC would be administered in much the same way as the earned income credit. Workers could claim it on their annual tax returns or could receive advance payment through their employers.
Advance payment. The system would work as follows:
Ⅺ An employee would request advance payment by submitting a form resembling the W-5 used for the EIC. Ⅺ The employer would determine the employee premium contribution for the type of coverage the employee selected (single or family); it would then determine the advance credit amount using IRS tables based on the required contribution and the employee's wages. The advance payment would be made in each paycheck, partially or fully offsetting the employee premium contribution deduction in the same paycheck. Ⅺ The employer would deduct advance ESIC payments from its periodic payment of Social Security and Medicare employment taxes. As with the EIC, if the advance payments exceeded employment tax liability, the employer could reduce the advance ESIC payment or apply the excess to future employment taxes.
Ⅺ Advance payments would be reported on the employee's W-2 and by the employee on the 1040 form. Overpayment or underpayment of the advance ESIC would be reconciled in the final computation of tax payable or refund due.
Is advance payment worth the trouble? The amounts involved would often be fairly small. People who already have taken up ESI are somehow managing their current contributions and would presumably continue to do so if they had to wait until the end of the year for a credit. However, advance payment could encourage take-up by workers who previously declined ESI, and administration through payroll systems is considerably simpler than the voucher system proposed for the nongroup credit.
Some participants would have to refund excess advance payments during the annual reconciliation process. As Zelenak suggests, this might be burdensome for workers who seriously underestimated their income. However, it is likely that workers with access to ESI have more stable employment and income than other workers, so the problem might not be as great as under the nongroup credit. In addition, the amounts involved should be smaller.
The need for a reconciliation process would be obviated if the final ESIC amounts, like the advance payments, were based on the worker's wages, rather than on modified adjusted gross income (MAGI). However, many low-wage workers have multiple jobs or are in families with multiple earners. In 1998, one-third of all workers earning less than $15,000 from the job they spent the most time on were in families with incomes above 200% of poverty. 25 Basing the credit on one worker's earnings at one particular job would dilute the income targeting of the ESIC; it would also encourage families with ESI access through two family members' employment to shift to the plan of the lower-paid worker.
Additional employer reporting. The IRS would need to know three things to determine the credit amount for a taxpayer claiming it at the end of the tax year (and for reconciliation): the amount of the premium contributions the taxpayer made during the year; whether these contributions were for single or family coverage; and the taxpayer's MAGI. All of this information could be supplied simply by the taxpayer on a new 1040 schedule, but it would be useful for both the taxpayer and IRS to have the amount of the premium contribution reported by the employer on the W-2 form. This should not be difficult for most employers, since pay deductions for health insurance are commonly made through the same payroll system that ultimately generates the W-2. When employers make a fixed contribution to a union plan, however, they may not know what amount, if any, the employee is contributing. Separate reporting by the plan administrator might be needed.
For the purpose of enforcing the minimum employer contribution rule, it would also be appropriate for the W-2 to include either the amount of the employer contribution or the total cost of the plan. 26 This would be burdensome. Unlike employee contributions, employer contributions are not tracked through the payroll system; new data collection systems would be needed. The alternative, enforcing the rule through random audit, is even less satisfactory. If it turned out that a worker had claimed the ESIC for a plan not meeting the employer contribution requirement, who would be held responsible? Workers might have no idea what their employer was contributing toward their coverage. At the same time, employers contributing less than the minimum might have no idea that their workers were claiming the credit inappropriately (although they could at least be expected not to pay advance credits if they knew their plan didn't meet the test).
Determining access to ESI. If people with access to ESI were made ineligible for the nongroup credit, how could this rule be enforced? A similar rule already applies to the current federal health insurance tax deduction for the self-employed; the deduction is unavailable to people who are eligible for ESI directly or through a spouse. This rule, like most of the rest of the tax code, is enforced through self-reporting with random audits. Should there be a more systematic attempt to verify access to ESI?
States have tried to enforce similar eligibility restrictions for SCHIP or state-only programs in a variety of ways. Some verify employment, for example through data matching with the unemployment insurance agency, and then contact employers individually to determine whether ESI is available. This would obviously be a cumbersome way of administering a tax credit available to a large segment of the population.
Alabama is developing a system to track coverage of most of the state's population, using data voluntarily supplied by insurers. The IRS could establish a similar system by requiring that employers report availability of ESI on each worker's W-2. Reporting would be needed for every worker, as employers would have no way of knowing which employees were receiving the nongroup credit. In addition, many people are eligible for ESI during only part of a year and would be eligible for the nongroup credit the rest of the time. The employer would therefore have to report the actual time period of ESI eligibility. Such a burdensome system would face serious political barriers. In 1993, Congress actually enacted a requirement that all employers report to HCFA on workers and dependents receiving ESI; the aim was to identify Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries for whom ESI might be the primary payer. The requirement expired at the end of 1997 without ever having been implemented, chiefly because of complaints by employers about the workload involved. Because verifying ESI access is difficult, most states with exclusionary rules have tended to use an honor system, relying on information supplied by applicants themselves. The IRS would probably have to take a similar approach, despite the risks of gaming. A thorny problem that will not be resolved here is just what penalty nongroup credit recipients should face if they were found to have had access to ESI. Should they repay the whole credit, or perhaps just the excess over what they would have received under the ESIC?
Open enrollment. Workers who do not accept ESI when they initially become eligible but who wish to enroll later usually must wait for an annual open season. As a start-up provision only, employers might be required to allow workers to enroll in ESI at the beginning of the first tax year for which the ESIC was available.
Evaluating the Options
The usual measure of success for an incremental coverage expansion is the number of newly insured people per dollar spent. If considered in these terms, the com-bination of a nongroup credit and an ESIC might be less efficient in the short term than a nongroup credit alone. Table 1 compares the effects of the two options, using the simulations prepared for this project.
Adding the ESIC would reduce the proportion of workers with ESI who would shift to nongroup coverage, compared to the proportion who would shift if the nongroup credit were the only option available. At the same time, it would induce many more uninsured people to take up coverage, both because enrollment through an employer plan is more convenient and because the combination of employer contributions and the ESIC leaves more potential participants with little or no out-of-pocket cost than would the nongroup credit alone. Still, most of the new spending would go for families that have already taken up ESI. As a result, the estimated cost per newly insured person is $3,643, compared to $3,258 for the nongroup credit alone. While the per capita difference is only about 12%, the overall cost of adding the ESIC, in 1999 dollars, is nearly $15 billion more than the cost of the nongroup credit alone.
Spending money for modest-income people who are already insured can be defended on equity grounds; it would be unfair to extend free coverage to people without ESI while ESI participants at the same income level are making steadily higher contributions toward the cost of their coverage. However, there are many inequities in the current system-such as the higher tax subsidy for coverage of the highestpaid workers. If the total amount the nation is prepared to spend is limited, it might seem reasonable to target funds to the uninsured before attempting to correct these imbalances.
It is possible that the simulation understates the potential for coverage shifting under the nongroup credit alone. It assumes that workers with ESI cannot individually negotiate higher wages in exchange for dropping their ESI and shifting to the nongroup credit. Instead, a ''cash-out'' is assumed to occur only if all the workers in a firm on average would benefit from this change. As was suggested earlier, individual negotiation is certainly conceivable, especially in very small firms. More important, the incentives created by the nongroup credit would be expected over the long run to lead to erosion of ESI for low-income workers. Employers seeking to attract workers who were eligible for the maximum nongroup credit would do better to offer higher wages or other benefits instead of ESI.
The likelihood that this would happen is directly related to the generosity of the publicly funded program. If the tax credit were stingy or a public insurance program imposed significant premiums, ESI might retain its current advantages for most workers. The trade-off is that increasing costs for programs other than ESI to prevent shifts out of ESI would also reduce take-up by the currently uninsured without ESI access.
The problem, then, is one of balancing the potentially conflicting goals of providing adequate public support for low-income people while retaining the advantages of ESI. ESI may be a good way of organizing and administering health insurance, because of economies of scale, pooling of risks, and ease of participation. It is not a very good way of financing coverage for low-income people, because they are effectively paying for the coverage themselves, with limited support from the current tax preference. (This support itself is more beneficial to workers in higher tax brackets.) If public funds are to play a larger role in assuring coverage for workers below a given income level, it is not clear why access to these funds should depend on where someone works.
This view has led to proposals that would provide the same level of public support to people with a given income regardless of how they obtained coverage. The tax preference for employer-paid coverage would be eliminated, and the savings used to provide a uniform income-based credit that could be used for either ESI or nongroup coverage. (See, for example, Pauly 1999.) These proposals raise serious concerns. Even if employers continued to offer a plan, healthier workers might find that they could get better rates by leaving their groups. Some might enroll in less comprehensive plans, while many more might forgo coverage altogether. Meanwhile, higher-risk workers would be left behind in a steadily deteriorating employer risk pool. (These effects could be mitigated, but probably not eliminated, by insurance market reforms and/or development of new pooling mechanisms.)
The ESIC considered here represents a middle solution, putting some additional public funds into the employer-based system. It is not large enough to completely remove any incentive for coverage shifting. To the extent that workers forgo wages to obtain an employer contribution to ESI, a credit that assists only with the employee share of premiums would still leave many of these workers worse off than if they could find a job with higher wages and no ESI. 27 The ESIC proposal would therefore include a rule locking workers into available ESI at the price of leaving many of these workers comparatively disadvantaged. Still, it is more equitable than either the current system or a system that provides expanded public assistance only to people without ESI access.
Even this compromise solution entails significant short-term costs for people who are already covered. While it might be true that the nongroup credit could lead to steady erosion of ESI, the market could take many years to respond fully to the new incentives, while the ESIC would begin costing money right away. Moreover, there would be no sure way to prevent at least some employers from capturing the new federal dollars by increasing required employee contributions. Still, it seems advisable that any large coverage expansion using public funds include at least some additional public support for low-income ESI participants. A system that permanently disadvantages low-income workers with access to ESI is unlikely to be sustainable over the long term. The wage increase could in turn be put into a tax-fa-vored flexible spending account that would cover the premium increase, leaving both the employer and the worker with no net change in tax liability. 7 In this example, the cost to the employer to hold workers fully harmless, after payroll and income taxes, would be about $70 for workers in the 15% bracket, leaving a savings of $30. Only if the ESI subsidy were less than 30% of the employee share would it be unprofitable for employers to tinker with contributions and wages in this way. 8 States are allowed to use a lower percentage if they can justify it; the few ESI assistance programs approved to date all have a 50% minimum. 9 This is true of a program offering publicly financed coverage to adults. It is not necessarily true under SCHIP, where the public program covers only children, while an ESI subsidy may represent a contribution to the cost of coverage for the entire family (because the employer will not allow enrollment of the children alone). As the employer contribution to family coverage declines, there is some point at which it becomes cheaper to cover just the children directly. 10 Here again, the likelihood of this response depends in part on the relative attractiveness or generosity of the public program. However, it seems probable that many low-income workers who could be assured of at least some basic level of publicly financed, virtually free coverage would prefer to shift if they could then receive some portion of the employer's savings in the form of higher wages. 11 The nongroup credit would be reduced by $150 per $1,000 in income above a phase-out point that varies by family size. The credit would reach zero for a single person with income of $30,200, for a couple with income of $48,600, or for a family of six with income of almost $66,000. 12 In firms where over 35% of workers earned less than $20,000 per year in 1999, the average employer contribution was 82% for single coverage and 60% for family coverage (KFF-HRET 1999). 13 At the same time, the pool of nongroup purchasers would be improved by a potential influx of low-risk enrollees. In the absence of nongroup insurance-rate regulation, however, this would do nothing to lower prices for higher-risk purchasers. Insurers in a competitive market would instead have an incentive to offer low-risk purchasers the best possible benefits that could be furnished for the credit amount, while offering highrisk applicants fewer benefits at a higher price. 14 The incentives for this are greater in large experiencerated or self-insured employer plans. Because of smallgroup market reforms in most states, the costs of highrisk employees are spread across the entire pool, and an individual employer might not see savings from shifting one employee. 15 There would be no incremental cost if a worker whose employer offered only a choice of single or family coverage enrolled the children as well as a spouse in the family plan. There would be a cost if a single parent enrolled children under family coverage, or if a couple could have obtained a two-adult rate. On balance, given that employers must be covering at least half the cost (really about a third after the tax subsidy), the ESIC is probably less costly for the federal government. 16 Plans that weren't really ''health insurance,'' such as separate dental or vision plans or plans providing fixed hospital indemnity payments, should be excluded. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act's definition of ''excepted benefits'' could be used.
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17 In practice, states must do both, because there are almost no employer plans whose copayments or other cost sharing will not in some cases exceed the SCHIP maximums. 18 Assessing benefits would be relatively easy if all employers bought one of a few standardized plans from major carriers. But many employer plans are self-insured, and there might be considerable variation even in the insured plans that different firms bought from a single carrier. 19 For example, someone earning $20,000 would receive a nongroup credit of $1,535 and would have to pay $465 for a $2,000 nongroup policy. A worker with the same income receiving the ESIC would pay nothing for a $2,000 employer plan if the employer's contribution were at least the minimum 70%. 20 For example, a ''personal responsibility amount'' (PRA) would be established for each worker. This would be the amount a worker at the same wage level receiving the nongroup credit would have to contribute toward a $2,000 nongroup plan. The ESIC could equal the actual employee contribution minus the PRA. This smaller ESIC would be less costly, but it would also be less likely to encourage participation by workers currently declining ESI. It would also create the very high marginal tax rate that Zelenak notes as a concern with the nongroup credit. 21 This could occur if the employer plan is very generous, if the employer is in a high-cost area, or if the group has many older or sicker workers. For couples, an employer plan could also be high cost if it offered only single and family rates instead of a separate two-adult rate.
22 The 80% factor is arbitrary. A typical worker's contribution for single coverage is 20%. The employer's contribution is four times the worker's, and the tax subsidy (at about 30% of the employer's contribution) is 1.2 times the worker's contribution. However, using this factor to reduce the maximum ESIC heavily penalizes workers contributing a high share toward a high-cost plan. The lower factor protects these workers while overpaying some workers making lower contributions. 23 The Zelenak proposal adopts an income-determination methodology (the MAGI) that treats as countable income the value of the wages the worker could have received in lieu of benefits. It would therefore be consistent to treat the forgone wages as an employee contribution subject to reimbursement through the ESIC. 24 Merlis 1998 examines these questions in the context of SCHIP ESI assistance programs. 25 Author's calculation, based on the March 1999 supplement to the Current Population Survey. 26 Self-insured employers could report the nominal ''premium'' used in computing charges for participants in continuation coverage under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985. 27 The current exclusion of employer contributions from taxable income reduces the cost of coverage for a worker in the 15% bracket by about 28 cents for each dollar spent, while the refundable nongroup credit reduces the cost by a dollar. An ESIC would have to be much larger than the worker's actual ESI contribution to make the worker as well off retaining the ESI as dropping it. While the cost might still be less than the cost of the nongroup credit, a credit larger than the apparent amount spent by the worker would obviously be a difficult political sell.
